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A routine medical check-up led to the unexpected news that Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo
has non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, which had affected three areas in his body. The news affected the
political dynamics of a country whose progressive government has been kept in check by the rightist
opposition that does not hide its clear intentions of destabilizing the government to the point where
it falls.
Lugo, who took office in August 2008 without the support of a party structure that would ensure the
governing coalition a degree of power in the legislature, suffered—and still suffers—from ongoing
opposition threats to impeach him. Among his enemies was—and is—Vice President Federico
Franco, a young, ambitious leader of the Partido Liberal Revolucionario Auténtico (PLRA), the main
player in the Alianza Patriótica para el Cambio (APC), the heterogeneous grouping that brought
Lugo to power.
However, when the medical report confirmed the terrible finding, the president appeared politically
very active, with events that favored him and an until-then-unknown negotiating ability that
resulted in "friendly encounters" with those who want to see him out of the Casa de Gobierno.
For diverse media analysts, Lugo made important concessions to obtain a certain relief from the
tightened screws with which the right had immobilized him.

Pro-administration group forms, vice president weakened
Lugo celebrated two bits of good news before Aug. 6 when the doctors made their diagnosis. First,
some 20 small political parties and social organizations had formed the Frente Guasú ("great" in
Guaraní, one of the country's two official languages) to compete in the Nov. 7 municipal elections in
support of official policies.
When Lugo took office, within the APC he had the backing only of campesino organizations, which
have been gradually distancing themselves from the administration, disillusioned that not even the
first steps have been taken toward the promised agrarian reform.
The Frente Guasú (FG) emerges, and that is good for Lugo. Ricardo Canese, a FG founder and
candidate for mayor of the capital Asunción, said, "What we are trying to do is capture the largest
possible number of municipal governments to generate a structure capable of achieving greater
power nationally, with our sights on the 2013 legislative and presidential elections."
The second piece of good news was that Vice President Franco was the big loser in the PLRA's
internal elections, coming in third in the vote for party president. The winner was Sen. Blas Llano,
the only legislator who unconditionally supports the administration. That is also good for the
president.
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As political analyst and head of the UN's Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) Line Bareiro Bobadilla told ANSA news agency, "You can say that Llano won, but
it was Lugo who really came out strengthened."

Lugo makes concessions to opposition
At the same time, while regaining more consistent political support, Lugo began to negotiate with
the opposition, that is, with the right. Some of his decisions were disconcerting for his supporters.
First, he promoted an "anti-kidnapping law" and then an "anti-terrorist law," which brought
opposition from progressive sectors who feared that it would become a repressive tool in the service
of the large landowners.
The anti-kidnapping law, pushed despite the opinion of jurists, politicians, and people who have
been kidnapped or been affected by kidnappings, authorizes the government to freeze the bank
accounts of kidnappers, their relatives, and their accomplices or business associates.
The law's advocates insist that it will cripple criminals' ability to extort money. Its detractors say
that it will give free rein to repressive forces and that it is nothing more than part of a two-pronged
strategy mounted by the right to eventually force passage of the anti-terrorist law, the real objective
of those extreme sectors.
The Uruguayan weekly Brecha, one of the better-informed publications on regional politics, quoted
some of Lugo's longtime friends as saying that the anti-terrorist law means the active cooperation
of US troops in military-intelligence matters and counterinsurgency operations, in both cases from
Colombia. In late August 2008, a few days after taking office, Lugo signed a cooperation agreement
in Bogotá with then Colombian President Álvaro Uribe.
In early July, Defense Minister Luis Bareiro Spaini—Lugo's most loyal supporter on the Cabinet
—challenged the president on two counts. First, he said that he did not understand "fighting
insecurity and criminal drug-trafficking bands with the collaboration of two countries—the US and
Colombia—that stand out for their systematic failure in fighting both scourges." Second, he said that
"establishing a policy of cooperation with the intelligence services of those countries means opening
the doors to once more suffer US interference in Paraguay's internal affairs."
Bareiro Spaini's statements drew the ire of ultraright Paraguayan newspapers ABC Color and La
Nación. The Congress voted first on a motion to censure the minister and then began impeachment
proceedings. Finally, on Aug. 24, Bareiro Spaini was forced to resign, without Lugo standing up for
the person who until then had been his most loyal supporter.
A month later, on Sept. 20, the president dismissed, for the third time in his administration, the
entire military leadership, which Bareiro Spaini had put in place.

US personnel in country
On Sept. 10, Brecha reported on the presence of "US counterinsurgency and anti-drug-trafficking
experts" in Paraguayan territory. The report said they were operating in central and northeastern
departments, precisely the area where Lugo cemented his enormous prestige by supporting the
campesino movement when he was a Catholic bishop.
While the anti-terrorist law calls for joint operations with other countries, the presence of US
personnel in Paraguay would normally have required prior congressional approval. In this case it
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was not necessary, however, because the Lugo government and the administration of US President
Barack Obama had reaffirmed a bilateral "cooperation agreement" in effect since October 1961
when it was signed by US President Dwight Eisenhower and the notorious Paraguayan dictator
Gen. Alfredo Stroessner (1954-1989), the top caudillo of the Partido Colorado (Asociación Nacional
Republicana, PC).
The Uruguayan newspaper's sources recalled that, at the end of the 1960s, and protected by that
same bilateral agreement, "the victims were militants of the Ligas Agrarias, a Christian cooperative
movement." Today, to "justify the repression and the installation of US advisors," added Brecha,
"they allege the presence in the area of the Ejército Popular Paraguay (EPP), a supposed guerrilla
group, perhaps nonexistent, that has never had a confrontation with the regular Army (NotiSur,
May 14, 2010) and (June 11, 2010). An estimated 25 rebels are keeping nearly 7 million Paraguayans
terrified."
The opposition brings to bear all its power aided by the general climate of discontent resulting from
the inaction of a president who had raised huge expectations in the population. Lugo came to power
on a platform whose top priority was regaining energy sovereignty, undermined by Brazil through
the Itaipú binational dam (NotiSur, June 19, 2009). Paraguay's giant neighbor receives 95% of the
electricity produced by Itaipú and pays Paraguay less than market value for the 45% of its half that it
does not use. (Paraguay only uses 5% of the total electricity generated by Itaipú.)
No concrete steps have been taken to implement the second plank on the platform, agrarian reform.
In recent months, the Coordinadora por la Soberanía y la Reforma Agraria resumed its policy of
occupying idle lands. On Aug. 10, some 1,500 campesinos took over 22,000 hectares belonging to a
powerful Brazilian landowner who the campesinos allege is linked to drug trafficking.
Although still not reaching the whole population because of a lack of resources, infrastructure, and
qualified personnel, a program to provide free public health services is the most successful policy
implemented in the 26 months that Lugo has been president. Other successes include providing
assistance to some 100,000 of the nearly 300,000 families living in indigence and regularizing the
work situation of thousands of public employees who lacked any administrative recognition.
"In a ravaged country without resources, no one can say that nothing has been done," says the
FG founding document. Canese says, "There are sectors of the population that demand quicker
progress, but the majority understand that Lugo inherited vices and structures from more than
60 years of Partido Colorado rule [including the 34 years of the dictatorship] and that social
achievements must be made a step at a time."
For the FG leader, getting society to understand this is one of the new party's principal tasks, along
with challenging the right in the realm of ideas to create an authentic progressive conscience among
Paraguayans and again attract popular sympathy for Lugo. And, above all, to separate Lugo from his
new, dangerous friends and simultaneously pressure him to return to his roots.

-- End --
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